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Abstract
The popular practice of “leading by the successful” is viewed as a hallmark
of motivational leadership. A central rationale for leaders to make successful
team members salient is that it may induce social learning, where followers
strive to adopt a favorable behavior. The reliance of a leader on such success-
biased social learning presumes that imitation by followers occurs only to the
extent as outstanding success was caused by a superior ability or knowledge
of the respective peer. In this article, we conduct a laboratory experiment to
study whether imitation of the successful may occur even if imitation neces-
sarily fails to be an effective way of improving one’s performance. The ex-
perimental approach establishes the necessary control to assure that success-
biased learning cannot systematically improve the decisions made, and allows
us to isolate the behavior of the followers from possible feedback effects of the
leader. The data show that a substantial amount of imitation occurs, which
in our setting leads to a sizeable and persistent increase of the average risk
taken in the teams. Our finding thus indicates a limitation of the practice to
lead with the successful.
Keywords: social learning, laboratory experiments, motivational leadership
“Imitation is not just the sincerest form of flattery - it’s the sincerest form
of learning.” — George Bernard Shaw
1 Introduction
Learning from successful peers is frequently regarded as an effective way to increase
one’s own success. By imitating the best, the members of a team may benefit from
the knowledge of successful team members (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009; Venki-
tachalam and Busch, 2012). Ultimately, this insight culminates into the leadership
practice of deliberately making successful strategies visible (Szulanski, 1996; Seidler-
de Alwis and Hartmann, 2008; Garvin, Edmondson and Gino, 2008). This idea of
“leading with the successful” has found wide recognition as part of a leader’s toolkit
for managing a team. In this respect, practical literature emphasizes the positive
role that praise and recognition of top performers play for motivating other team
members (Gostick and Elton, 2009; Podsakoff et al., 2006), advises to make perfor-
mance transparent as an effective strategy for leaders (Daghfous, 2004; Dewhurst,
Guthridge and Mohr, 2009), and generally recommends peer learning as a powerful
way of improving team performance (Argote, 1999; Goh, 2002; Palmer and Blake,
2018; Darino and Williams, 2019).
Such motivational leadership practices have a counterpart in the literature on cul-
tural evolution or evolutionary psychology, where observing and imitating successful
individuals is regarded as a powerful way of acquiring useful information (Jiménez
and Mesoudi, 2019; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Baldini, 2012; Bandura, 1962,
1977). Imitation is likely to be effective, if success is the consequence of a system-
atic tendency to perform well within a common decision environment. By contrast,
if success of a top performer largely results from good fortune, rather than from some
form of superior ability or knowledge, imitation may fail to improve the imitator’s
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success. Moreover, imitation may then have adverse effects if a successful outcome
is mis-attributed to other aspects than luck (Jones and Harris, 1967; Denrell and
Fang, 2010).1
Attending preferentially to successful individuals could prevail, even if success is a
consequence of luck. This possibility suggests a conceivable limitation in the strat-
egy to lead with the successful, in particular, if success-biased learning is a persistent
trait among team members. Can a leader, who chooses to lead with the most suc-
cessful, rely on the team members to avoid imitating success when imitation fails to
improve success? Or will imitation prevail, potentially leading to unintended conse-
quences for the organization’s culture? Does such adverse and unintended imitation
depend on team compositions, e.g., in terms of demographic characteristics, or on
dynamic properties of the environment, such as “prospering” or “receding” times?
In this article, we study whether success-biased behavior emerges in teams if suc-
cess is both made salient to all team members but also a sheer consequence of
luck. Imitation therefore cannot improve the likelihood of one’s success. To study
this question, we implement a tightly controlled laboratory experiment (Antonakis
et al., 2010; Podsakoff and Podsakoff, 2019), where we use investment decisions un-
der uncertainty as the incentivized choices that need to be made by the participants.
In the experiment, individual investment choices in each of 45 identical periods
can only influence the riskiness of the choices, but not the expected return of the
chosen investments. Importantly, choices cannot affect the likelihood of success in
any period – successful results are purely stochastic outcomes which are independent
1Variants of the mis-attribution problem can be found in success-breeds-success dynamics when
positive feedback bestows success on the already successful (van de Rijt et al., 2014), or if un-
dersampling of failure leads to a selective focus on success (Denrell, 2003). Likewise, Kirchler,
Lindner and Weitzel (2018) find evidence of non-salutary organizational ranking effects on risk
taking (Kirchler, Lindner and Weitzel, 2018).
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and identically distributed over all periods. Because our setup assures that any in-
vestment’s outcome depends solely on luck, imitating other investors can only affect
the risk borne by one’s investment decisions, but it cannot systematically increase
the expected return of the investment strategy. The experimental instructions and
procedure make sure that these aspects are commonly known to all subjects before
the experiment starts.
To study whether success-biased behavior emerges as a consequence of leading
with the successful, we randomly partition the subjects into groups of 6 members.
At the end of each period, we display the investment decision and the success of
the most successful group member to all group members. In our experiment, this
procedure systematically selects the subjects who take the highest risks with their
decisions. Success-biased behavior occurs if group members respond to this social
information by increasing their own risk-taking in their subsequent decisions. To test
whether the resulting behavioral pattern is driven by the association of risk-taking
with success, we compare it to a control treatment, where the least successful group
member is displayed. This procedure assures that both treatments identically select
the subjects bearing the highest risks, but only one of the treatment associates this
risk-seeking with success.
Our wider contribution is to provide a controlled empirical assessment of the
consequences of operational leadership strategies (Judge, 2004; Eagly, Johannesen-
Schmidt and van Engen, 2003; Antonakis, Avolio and Sivasubramaniam, 2003; An-
tonakis et al., 2010; Podsakoff and Podsakoff, 2019; Eisenkopf, 2020). There is a
growing interest in understanding the limitations and constraints motivational lead-
ership can face. When can such leadership backfire? Often, empirical researchers
face a dilemma. Leaders implement a strategy, followers respond, and then leaders
respond in turn by adjusting their strategy. The feedbacks in both directions can
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confound the empiricist attempting to isolate the effects of the original leadership
strategy. To overcome this problem, we test our predictions using laboratory exper-
iments. The experimental setup allows us to control a leader’s choice of strategies to
make success visible, and solely analyse the actions of followers as a response. Using
such an experiment thus allows us to identify causally the limitations leaders face
when they employ strategies meant to motivate individuals. In this respect, our data
point towards a limitation of leadership strategies aimed at motivating followers by
endorsing a comparison with the successful, if success is of a coincidental nature.
Moreover, the experimental approach allows to exogenously vary the economic con-
ditions, simulating, e.g., the experience of a “boom” or a “bust”, enabling us to
study whether success-biased behavior is prone to, or resilient against dynamically
changing conditions.
Finally, our article contributes to the literature on evolutionary informed schol-
arship. Our research highlights the importance of understanding persistent traits
and behavioral tendencies of followers. Prior research suggests an evolutionary basis
for leadership-followership relations, based on leader cues, such as competence and
performance (Van Vugt and Grabo, 2015; Bastardoz and Van Vugt, 2019). We also
include the effects of different demographic predictors of success-biased learning into
our analysis, which closely follows current research on individual heterogeneity in
social learning and its cultural evolutionary consequences (Molleman, van den Berg
and Weissing, 2014; Mesoudi et al., 2016). Given this potential heterogeneity, we
further investigate how it can inform a leader’s decision about whether or not to
make success visible to followers.
2 Experimental Design and Procedure
In this section we outline the experimental design and procedure.
4
2.1 Individual Choices
Our experiment consisted of 45 identical rounds, designed as investment decisions.
In each round, an individual had to allocate a total of 20 indivisible tokens on two
sides (Left and Right); see Figure 7 in the Appendix for a screenshot. All 20 tokens
had to be allocated. After all subjects allocated their tokens, the computer ran-
domly determined a winning side, where either Left or Right was chosen with equal
probability. The selected side yielded a return G > 1 per token invested on that side,
while the other side paid a return of 0.5 per invested token. We refer to G as the “win
factor”, and a dynamically changing value of G was part of our treatment variations.
The investment task was designed such that, by choosing a token allocation,
subjects effectively choose how much risk to take with their investments. Placing
10 tokens on each side corresponds to the risk-free allocation. The more tokens
are placed on one side, the more risky the allocation becomes. The maximally
risky allocation is to place all 20 tokens on the same side. Importantly, the chosen
allocation exclusively affects the risk undertaken but not the expected return – every
possible allocation had the same expected value of 10G+ 5 tokens.2
2.2 Groups and Treatments
Before the experiment started, subjects were randomly partitioned into groups of 6
members. All groups stayed constant during the entire experiment, and the com-
puter determined a common winning side for all members in a group at the end of
each round. These groups can be conceived as a workplace team, where all mem-
2Define cit ∈ {0, 1, ..., 20} as the number of tokens allocated to the right by i in t. By extension,
20− cit is the number allocated to the left. Let Xt be a random variable with support {0, 1} and
realizations xt such that Xt = 0 indicates that left was optimal in t, and Xt = 1 indicates that
right was optimal. The payoff for i in t is thus, πit = (1−xt)(G(20− cit) + cit2 ) +xt(
20−cit
2 +Gcit).
Importantly, participants could not increase their expected return on investment. The design
implies the same expected value irrespective of the allocation choice. The perfect diversification in
this setup is to invest 10 tokens into both the right and left project, minimizing the risk incurred.
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bers make individual economic decisions over time, but face a common economic
environment.
At the end of each period, we reported a member’s investment decision and payoff
from the previous round to all members of the group, while visualizing their choice
of allocating tokens into the Right and Left sides (see Figure 8 in the Appendix
for a screenshot). Our main treatment variation was whether the reported member
was the most or least successful group member in the prior period. That is, in one
treatment, we reported the member who achieved the highest payoff in the previ-
ous period, while we reported the member who achieved the lowest payoff in the
other treatment (see Figure 8 in the Appendix for a screenshot).3 Treatments were
randomly assigned across groups and did not change for the entire duration of a
session. For simple reference, we refer to the treatment displaying the best (worst)
performer as the “Most Successful” (“Least Successful”) treatment, respectively.
To become most successful in a group, one had to take a lot of risk and get
lucky. To become least successful in the group, one had to take a lot of risk and
get unlucky. Thus, in both treatments, we effectively selected the most extreme
risk takers and made their choices visible. The key difference is that in one case a
risky allocation profile was presented with the highest realized success while in the
other case a similar risky allocation profile was presented with the lowest realized
success. Note that neither success nor failure of the displayed group member can
be indicative of any superior skill or knowledge, as all draws were independent and
identically distributed, and all allocations yield the same expected return.
Previous research has shown that the economic conditions experienced by the sub-
jects can have substantial implications on the evolution of risk-seeking over time.
3If there was more than one individual who received the highest / lowest payoff in a group, the
computer broke ties randomly.
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For example, Malmendier and Nagel (2009) find that the experience of a contracting
economy with low returns is correlated with later risk avoidance. By contrast, booms
seem to trigger positive expectations which drive investment behaviour (Cohn et al.,
2015). For such reasons, we conducted three treatment variations, where G either
increased over time, remained stable, or decreased over time. These three variations
either represent an expanding economy, a stagnant economy or a contracting econ-
omy. We refer to these treatments as the Increasing, Stable or Decreasing Trend
treatments, respectively. In the increasing regime, G increases step-wise from 1.5 to
8.5 over the 45 periods in intervals of three periods, with increments of 0.5 each. In
the stable regime, G is constant with G = 5. In the decreasing regime, G declines
from 8.5 to 1.5. We implemented these three profitability trends by randomly as-
signing whether G is increasing, stable, or decreasing to the groups. All members
of a group face the same G in a given period.
All in all, this yields a 2× 3-design with the Most and Least Successful treatments
on one side and the three profitability trend treatments on the other side. In total,
we conducted 6 experimental sessions with 35 groups, and we recruited 210 subjects
from a large Swiss research university.4 Subjects are paid for one randomly drawn
period. The exchange rate was 0.65 Swiss Franc for 1 token earned.
3 Main Hypotheses
Our main conjecture is based on the premise that subjects behave according to
selective social learning, meaning that they are inclined to imitate a behavior that
has previously led to success. In our experiment, however, subjects cannot learn an
ability or a decision rule that systematically improves their performance, they can
only imitate the degree of risk taking (which we refer to as a risk profile). The core
45 sessions had 6 groups, and 1 session 5 groups. The data was collected in the first half of
2014.
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of our hypothesis is that success-biased subjects imitate the reported risk profile if
they correlate risk taking with success. Our two main treatments both display the
most extreme risk takers within a group, but their risk-seeking was associated with
success only in the Most Successful treatment. Thus, if our conjecture is correct,
we should necessarily be able to observe an overall increase in risk-seeking within
groups in the Most Successful treatment relative to the Least Successful treatment.
This is summarized in our main hypothesis.
(H1) Risk-seeking is higher in the Most Successful treatment than in the Least
Successful treatment.
Economic trend effects yield an additional piece of evidence relative to our key
conjecture. Specifically, booms and busts added the experience of being exposed
to rising or declining reported maximum payoffs. This exposure can be thought of
as increasing or decreasing the salience of the reported maximum payoff over time.
Therefore, we expect success-biased behavior to foster risk-seeking in the Increasing
Trend treatment given that the reported subject is the most successful decision
maker.
(H2) Given that the most successful subjects are reported, risk-seeking is larger
in the Increasing than in the Stable Trend treatment.
In case of declining economic trends, success becomes less salient over time. There-
fore, we expect to observe less risk-seeking in the Decreasing Trend treatment relative
to the Stable Trend treatment (and, by implication, also relative to the Increasing
Trend treatment).
(H3) Given that the most successful subjects are reported, risk-seeking is smaller
in the Decreasing than in the Stable Trend treatment (and smaller than in the
Increasing Trend treatment).
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Note that hypotheses H2 and H3 are centered around the possible effects of the
economic trend on risk-seeking through its effect of making success visible, as this
constitutes the focus of our study. In terms of hypothesis generation, we remain
agnostic about the possible effects of trends on risk-seeking that may arise without
social learning (Cohn et al., 2015).
4 Results
In this section, we present and discuss the main experimental findings. Section 4.1
defines the two measures of risk we use in Section 4.2 to test our main hypotheses.
Section 4.3 considers the effect of individual-level characteristics in the context of
our key conjectures.
4.1 Measurements of Risk
Our experimental design yields a simple measure of risk-seeking based on the indi-
vidual token allocations. Let cit denote subject i’s number of tokens invested on Left
in period t, such that 20− cit are the number of tokens invested on Right. Then, we




(cit − 10)2 +
1
2
((20− cit)− 10)2 = (cit − 10)2 (1)
as our main measure of risk-seeking.5 Thus, risk-seeking is minimal if cit = 10, and
is increasing the less balanced the allocation of the tokens is. Further, we use the
absolute difference between cit and 20− cit
DiffAllocation = |cit − (20− cit)| = 2|cit − 10| (2)
5Note that VarAllocation simply is the scale-free version of the variance of the payoffs induced
by the lottery X = (cit, 20− cit), as V ar(X) = (10− cit)2(G− 0.5)2.
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as an alternative risk measure. While both measures provide the same ordinal
ranking of riskiness, the former is more sensitive to the effects related to extreme
allocations, while the latter is more sensitive to effects related to intermediate allo-
cations.
4.2 Risk-Seeking: Main Treatment Effects
We test our main hypotheses using a standard linear regression framework with
the above measures of riskiness as dependent variables. Specifically, we estimate
equations of the form
yigt = Xitα + Zgtβ + εig, (3)
where y is either VarAllocation or DiffAllocation, i indicates a subject belonging
to group g, t indicates the round, Z is a vector of treatment dummies and X is
a specification-depending vector of control variables. We use a small number of
demographic control variables, which have been previously associated with risky in-
vestment behavior, especially in tasks that involve social learning. These controls are
age (Mata et al., 2011), gender (Charness and Gneezy, 2012; dummy variable with
male=1), and income (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).6 Finally, we estimate boot-
strapped standard errors with clustering at the group level in all our regressions.
Specifically, we use several standard methods of deriving such standard errors, and
report the most conservative ones in this article.7 In the Appendix, we provide
variable definitions in Table 3, and general summary statistics in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 6 summarizes the various correlations between treatments and demographic
covariates.
6Our main regression results turn out to be insensitive to these controls. As expected, our
treatment assignment is statistically balanced on gender, income and age; see Table 5 in the
Appendix.
7We estimate clustered standard errors with three different methods, Sandwich, Pairs, and
Wild cluster bootstrap (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008, 2011) - estimates are reported in the
Appendix. We report the Pairs Boostrap errors, which are based on re-sampling the clusters with
replacement.
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Our leading hypothesis is that risk-seeking should be higher in the Most Successful
than in the Least Successful treatment. The following result reports the outcome
of a regression that compares average risk-seeking between the Most and the Least
Successful treatment, pooling the data across all three trend regimes.
Result 1 Averaged across all trend regimes, the allocation variance is 11.6 points
higher in the Most Successful than in the Least Successful treatment (p = 0.011).
Likewise, the allocation difference is 2.5 tokens larger in the Most Successful than
in the Least Successful treatment (p < 0.01). This shows that average risk-seeking
increases in the Most Successful relative to the Least Successful treatment, consistent
with hypothesis H1.
We emphasize that this result holds independent of the control variables. In Ap-
pendix 7.5 we present additional evidence supporting our main hypothesis – that
social learning fosters risk-seeking if risk-seeking is associated with success. In par-
ticular, we exclude that the treatment effect is driven by a decrease in average
risk-seeking in the Least Successful condition. In fact, we find that risk-seeking
increased in both treatments during the experiment, but significantly and substan-
tially more so in the Most Successful treatment.
Table 1 presents a fine-grained regression analysis, where we differentiate between
all 6 treatment variations. Specifically, we define a treatment dummy for each com-
bination of the two dimensions: Stable, Decreasing or Increasing Trend, and Least
or Most successful treatment. In Table 1, we use the “Least Successful and Stable
Trend” treatment as the omitted category. The Table consists of 6 similar estima-
tions, differing only in the included control variables. Table 1 shows various condi-
tional treatment effects, depending on the profitability regime. With respect to our
main hypothesis, Table 1 shows that for the Increasing and Stable Trend treatment
separately, risk-seeking significantly increases in the Most Successful treatment com-
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pared to the Least Successful treatment. For the Decreasing Trend regime, however,
we find no evidence for a statistical difference between risk-seeking in the Most and
Least Successful treatments. These observations are confirmed by Table 2, which
uses DiffAllocation as the dependent variable instead.
Table 1: Variance of Allocation
DV: VarAllocation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Least successful, decreasing 8.01 9.22 9.37 9.03 8.32 9.22
(6.77) (7.45) (7.31) (7.44) (7.05) (7.37)
Least successful, increasing 10.90∗∗ 11.04∗ 11.58∗∗ 10.85∗ 11.35∗∗ 11.04∗
(4.73) (6.20) (5.63) (5.83) (5.22) (5.90)
Most successful, stable 22.97∗∗∗ 22.74∗∗ 23.31∗∗ 22.55∗∗ 23.42∗∗∗ 22.74∗∗
(8.62) (9.49) (9.65) (9.48) (8.79) (9.57)
Most successful, decreasing 8.31 7.80 8.43 8.15 8.31 7.80
(5.43) (6.34) (5.54) (6.05) (5.56) (5.89)
Most successful, increasing 25.85∗∗∗ 25.79∗∗∗ 26.24∗∗∗ 25.73∗∗∗ 26.13∗∗∗ 25.79∗∗∗









Constant 8.12 15.97∗∗∗ 8.69 13.04∗∗ 9.32∗∗ 13.74∗∗∗
(12.54) (5.34) (13.58) (5.34) (4.15) (5.11)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at group level, 1st period omitted
We next turn to the effects of an increasing or decreasing trend on risk-seeking,
relative to a Stable Trend, if the most successful subject is reported. Together,
hypotheses H2 and H3 predict a clear ranking, where most (least) risk-seeking should
be observed in the Increasing (Decreasing) Trend treatment. The data from Tables
1 and 2 support this conjecture in part, as summarized in the next result.
Result 2 When the most successful subject is reported, risk-seeking is 15.4 variance
points higher in the Stable Trend treatment than in the Decreasing Trend treatment
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Table 2: Difference of Allocation
DV: DiffAllocation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Least successful, decreasing 1.41 1.66 1.66 1.64 1.51 1.66
(1.57) (1.72) (1.75) (1.70) (1.59) (1.65)
Least successful, increasing 2.20∗∗ 2.31∗ 2.31∗ 2.30∗ 2.36∗∗ 2.31∗
(1.05) (1.20) (1.24) (1.20) (1.09) (1.24)
Most successful, stable 4.48∗∗∗ 4.53∗∗ 4.53∗∗ 4.51∗∗ 4.64∗∗ 4.53∗∗
(1.70) (1.89) (1.79) (1.90) (1.84) (1.92)
Most successful, decreasing 1.90∗ 1.96 1.96 1.99 2.05∗ 1.96
(1.10) (1.22) (1.27) (1.22) (1.21) (1.24)
Most successful, increasing 5.26∗∗∗ 5.33∗∗∗ 5.33∗∗∗ 5.33∗∗∗ 5.39∗∗∗ 5.33∗∗∗









Constant 6.04∗∗∗ 5.39∗∗∗ 5.38∗∗ 5.15∗∗∗ 4.32∗∗∗ 5.36∗∗∗
(2.20) (1.08) (2.73) (1.11) (0.91) (1.19)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at group level
(p < 0.1), and 18.5 variance points higher in the Increasing Trend treatment than
in the Decreasing Trend treatment (p < 0.01). A similar pattern holds for alloca-
tion differences, which is consistent with Hypothesis H3. For the Increasing Trend
treatment compared to the Stable Trend treatment, we don’t find evidence (H2) for
a significant increase of risk-seeking (3.1 variance points, p = 0.73).
The weak evidence for a positive effect of the Increasing Trends treatment (H2)
may be in part due to a weak substitution effect between the treatment effect of
providing information on the most successful, and a direct effect of increasing trends
on risk taking. Additional exploratory evidence suggests that participants reacted
to the salience of success in the predicted direction but also that Increasing Trends
increased risk taking in the Least Successful information treatment more so than in
the Most Successful information treatment, where information about strong success
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was already present.8 Tables 1 and 2 further show that, compared to the Stable
Trend - Least Successful treatment, risk-seeking does not change with a decreasing
trend, even if the most successful subjects are reported. Together with our previ-
ous results, this suggests an asymmetric role for information about success. When
success became more salient, either because the highest success was selectively re-
ported, or alternatively, because the magnitude of reported success increased over
time, the evidence of our experiment shows an increase in risk-seeking. By contrast,
if the magnitude of reported success decreased over time, or the least successful sub-
jects were displayed, risk-seeking of the reported member seemed not to be imitated.
We also run the previous regressions by controlling for general time effects. In Model
6 of Tables 2 and 1, we include the respective period of the investment task into
the estimation. This allows us to control for a possibly increasing experience of
the subjects with the experiment over time. Including such a time trend has no
effect on the treatment estimates, not even in the Stable Trend treatment, where
experienced-based learning is perhaps most likely to appear. Furthermore, including
a subject-specific linear time trend to control for individual time effects (e.g., due
to individual-level learning), has also no effect on the treatment estimates.
In the Appendix, we summarize the estimates of a more sophisticated model
that groups together consecutive periods and interacts period with the demographic
controls.9 This result confirms that time (or experience) seem to play no decisive
role for our main treatment effects.
8In the Least successful information treatment, Increasing Trends increased risk taking by 11.05
variance points (p = 0.054), compared to Stable Trends. The overall treatment effect of Most
Successful information compared to Least Successful information is then 8.0 variance points less
(not significant, p = 0.47) in the Increasing Trends treatment (15.1 variance points, p < 0.05) than
in the Stable Trends treatment (23.1 variance points, p < 0.05).
9See Tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix.
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4.3 The Effects of Individual Characteristics
We established our main findings regarding the effects of social learning on risk-
seeking by controlling for gender, age and income, as these factors have been previ-
ously related to risk attitudes. This analysis, focusing on average treatment effects,
did not address whether demographic characteristics matter for individual decisions,
while previous research has pointed to possible gender and age effects in social learn-
ing (Mesoudi et al., 2016; Lind and Lindenfors, 2010; Berl and Hewlett, 2015). For
this reason, we conducted a subgroup analysis that exploits the in-sample varia-
tion of gender and age to study if differential effects arise once the most successful
subject is made visible. We also include income as a potential variable to affect
success-biased social learning. Obtaining such insights is of relevance for the liter-
ature on team composition and performance management (Webber and Donahue,
2001; Kozlowski and Bell, 2003; Jackson and Joshi, 2004). So far, this literature has
found mixed evidence regarding the role of gender, age or income of the followers
for effective leadership in case of heterogeneously composed teams. In this respect,
our data allows us to explore whether these demographic variables matter through
a social learning channel.
We study whether gender, age or income have a differential impact on individual
risk-seeking, given that either the best or worst performing subject is displayed to
a group, by estimating a fully saturated model, including all interaction effects be-
tween gender, age and income with the 6 treatments. Figure 1 visualizes some of
the average marginal effects derived from the full model, which can be found in
the Appendix.10 We discuss the main insights of the detailed analysis below, where
all reported numbers about risk are based on VarAllocation (DiffAllocation yields
similar results).
10Figure 1 refers to Table 7, model (7).
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As a summative preview, we find some evidence for heterogeneous effects, which
intuitively supports that social learning is a relevant driving force behind our treat-
ment effects. Moreover, heterogeneity seems relevant for understanding when teams
may abandon imitation of the best, or adopt it. In particular, the evidence indicates
that more mature individuals and a mix of genders can decrease a team’s tendency
to imitate the most successful individuals, at least when success is not a signal for
ability. We emphasize that our data does not allow to interpret the possible effects of
the demographic variables in a causal way. Nevertheless, we think that studying the
effect of group compositions, as a major treatment variable, might be a promising
avenue for future research, on how the effectiveness of leading with the successful
may be mitigated by different ways of learning in teams.
4.3.1 Gender
Prior research has found that, depending on the domain and society, gender can
sometimes moderate social learning, but the evidence in general is inconclusive
(Mesoudi, 2011; Lind and Lindenfors, 2010; Demps, 2012). With respect to risk-
seeking, the existing literature commonly finds men to bear more risk than women
(see, e.g., Charness and Gneezy, 2012; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), emphasizing
a higher competitiveness of men. Our experimental data allows us to test whether
risk-seeking is larger for men in the context of social learning and, in addition,
whether this effect changes conditional on improving or deteriorating economic con-
ditions.
Our main question of interest is if men and women responded differently in their
risk-seeking depending on whether the social information displays success or failure
as a consequence of risk-taking. The data shows a versatile picture. Averaged across
all economic trend treatments, the data does not support that displaying the most
successful group member relative to the least successful member induced a differen-
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tial effect for men and women. However, a more fine-grained analysis suggests that
this finding results from opposed forces, depending on the exact trend condition, as
explained in the next paragraph.
Men displayed significantly more risk-seeking if they see the most successful
group member, relative to seeing the least successful member, in the Increasing and
Stable Trend treatments. Specifically, risk-seeking increases by 20 variance points
(p < 0.05) from 27 to 47 points in the Increasing Trend treatment, and by 27 points
(p < 0.01) from 14 to 41 points in the Stable Trend treatment. By contrast, we do
not find that women showed a statistically significant increase of their risk-seeking
in these treatments. In the Decreasing Trend treatment, however, the evidence sug-
gests that the role of gender is inverted. In this treatment, men reduced their risk
seeking by 14 points (p < 0.05) from 32 to 18, while women increased their risk-
seeking by 18 points (p < 0.01) from 12 to 30 points.
In sum, the evidence suggests a difference for the tendency to react to reported
success between men and women. This difference is conditional on whether reported
success increases or decreases over time. Based on our data, we would thus expect
teams consisting mostly of males to show a particularly pronounced rise in risk-
seeking if reported success does not diminish over time. By contrast, observing a
diminishing success of the most successful member seems to make the same team
cut back on its exposure to risk. For a team consisting mostly of women however,
risk taking would be less susceptible to increasing or decreasing reported successes.
4.3.2 Age
Previous experimental evidence indicates that younger people seem to be more prone
to social learning effects (Mesoudi et al., 2016; Berl and Hewlett, 2015). In partic-
























Success information x Return trend Most successful, stable Most successful, decrease Most successful, increase
Figure 1: Average marginal effects of the information treatment at different covariate
values of the fully saturated interaction model in column (7) of Table 7 in the
Appendix. Omitted category: stable, least successful manipulation. Differences
between regime trend effects are additive relative to the omitted category. Each
cell represents the estimated treatment effect at the covariate values on the x-axis,
holding the other covariates their mean. Bars represent 95 % CIs derived with
bootstrapped clustering at the level of a group.
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away from peer-based learning in adolescence. This observation is relevant as most
subjects are in between adolescence and adulthood in our student sample.
To assess whether younger subjects exert more social learning, we partitioned
the subjects into various age groups. Our data remains modestly inconclusive about
the effects of age. In particular, we do not find a statistically significant difference
between the main treatment effects for the various age groups. Nevertheless, the
data does indicate a rough tentative trend effect of age consistent with a diminished
importance of social learning with emerging adulthood (Mesoudi et al., 2016), at
least for the stable and increasing trend conditions. As Figure 1 shows, the treat-
ment effect is significantly larger than zero at younger age, but eventually becomes
indistinguishable from zero at older age. At age 21, which is the median age in
the sample, the average marginal treatment effect is 25.8 variance points in the sta-
ble regime (p < 0.01). At the 80th percentile age of 24, the effect is 18.3 points
(p = 0.12), for the 90th percentile at age 26 it is 13.4 (p = 0.4).
4.3.3 Income
In incentivized experiments involving risk taking, the participants’ levels of dispos-
able income may have conflicting effects. On the one side, subjects with higher
disposable income may be more prone to accepting gambles, for example, if they
are more affected by “house money” effects (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). In this
sense, one could expect subjects with higher income to display more risk-seeking
behavior, or at least pay more attention to decisions involving risks. On the other
side, wealthier subjects may respond less to experimental incentives (Camerer and
Hogarth, 1999), with ambiguous effects on a preferential bias to learn about suc-
cessful projects.
To assess the effect of disposable income in the context of our main treatment
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variable, we proceed similar to Age, and partition the self-reported income measure
into decile groups. As depicted in the right panel of Figure 1, the evidence indicates
that the level of income may indeed affect the relationship between top performance
visibility and risky investment choices. Specifically, top performance information is
positively associated with risk-seeking for individuals with lower disposable income.
At the 10th percentile income (200 CHF), the treatment effect is 27.2 points in the
stable regime (p < 0.01), while it decreases to 16.3 points at the 90th percentile
(1200 CHF), which is not significantly different from zero (p = 0.43). A similar
pattern applies for the other trend conditions as well. This finding suggests that
income may affect risk-taking through a social learning channel. In particular, a
simple explanation that wealthier students tended to take more risk cannot account
for the previous pattern. However, it is conceivable that wealthier subjects might
have paid less attention to successful outcomes in the investment task, which reduced
the amount of social learning, too.
5 Imitation and Persistence of Risk-Seeking
In this section, we investigate the behavior of the followers in greater detail. In a
first step, we study how group members learned in the experiment. In a second step,
we assess how risk-seeking evolves dynamically over time.
5.1 Imitation of the Allocation or the Risk Profile?
Social learning can take place in different ways in our experiment. On the one hand,
subjects could simply copy the exact allocation of the displayed individual, which
also has the effect of increasing risk-seeking. If subjects merely imitated the observed
allocation, the choice made by an observer should be positively correlated with the
choice she observed in the previous period. If such behavior is a dominating trait,
we should find that groups choose more often to allocate their tokens, e.g., on Right
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given that the reported subject previously allocated a majority of tokens on Right.
On the other hand, subjects could imitate the observed risk profile, i.e., the
imbalance of the displayed token allocation, independent from which of the two
projects was actually favored by the displayed individual. If the subjects imitated
the risk profile, rather than the allocation, we should find a positive relation between
the variances of the observers’ and the displayed subject’s allocations, but not nec-
essarily between the allocations themselves. A specific explanation consistent with
imitating the risk profile but not the specific allocation direction is Gambler’s Fal-
lacy. According to Gambler’s Fallacy, people should allocate more tokens on the
project which did not win in the previous period. That is, if the reported allocation
was strongly favoring Left, we should observe a shift in the next period of the al-
locations towards Right, and vice-versa. Our experimental design allows us to test
whether the possible occurrence of Gambler’s Fallacy depends on whether the re-
ported risky behavior was successful or not, thereby pointing towards a conceivable
moderating role of social learning.
Empirical Results Figures 2 and 3 provide a visual impression of how the alloca-
tion between Left and Right was affected by the observed allocation in the previous
round. Figure 2 refers to the case of the Most Successful treatment, for all three
trend treatments separately. Figure 3 displays the same type of information for the
Least Successful treatment. To illustrate the logic of these figures, consider the left
panel in Figure 2, which depicts the behavior in the Most Successful - Stable Trend
treatment. The horizontal axis groups the possible allocations of the reported indi-
vidual in various intervals, where negative intervals mean that the reported subjects
invested more tokens on Left. For example, the interval [−20,−15] means that a
subject invested at least 15 tokens on Left. The vertical axes uses the same in-
tervals, but displays the allocation of the subjects in the subsequent period. The
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size of the black disks expresses the absolute frequency of the respective combination.
If subjects were to imitate the observed allocation, we should see the largest
disks in the bottom left and upper right corner, respectively. The figures display
vastly different patterns. First, Figure 2 indicates that, in the Most Successful treat-
ments, people tend to respond with extreme allocations (but not always), but these
allocations may also favor the opposite field, consistent with the pattern implied by
Gambler’s Fallacy. Second, there is no pronounced response in terms of extreme
allocations in the Least Successful treatments. Rather, subjects seem to have set-
tled their allocations around the middle, consistent with our previous result that
risk-seeking is higher in the Most Successful treatment.
Figures 4 and 5 show how the variance of the allocation of the group members
(vertical axis) relates to the variance of the reported subject’s variance. If people
imitated the risk profiles, then we should observe larger disks towards the upper
right corners. The figures indeed confirm such a pattern in the Most Successful
treatments – most clearly so in the Stable or Increasing trend treatments – but not
in the Least Successful treatments. In particular, the fact that a lot of mass is lo-
cated at the extremes in the Most Successful treatments supports the idea that, for
social learning to pick up, the reported individual’s choices need to have yielded a
sufficiently salient success.
A more rigorous quantitative assessment confirms that, if at all, subjects responded
by investing more tokens on the opposite rather than on the same side as the re-
ported group member did (see Table 11 in the Appendix for the regression evidence).
The most remarkable piece of evidence is that we only find such behavior to occur
in case of the Most Successful treatment. This observation suggests a novel and in-
triguing possible connection between Gambler’s Fallacy and social learning: Social
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learning of the displayed risk seems to arise only if risk-taking was successful, and
when social learning arises, people tend to fall victim to Gambler’s Fallacy.
The following summarizes the main empirical insights of this section.
Result 3 The data shows that the subjects imitate the risk profile, rather than the
allocation, of the previously successful. In addition, we find evidence favoring the
occurrence of Gambler’s Fallacy. If the displayed successful allocation put most
tokens on Left, then the amount of tokens invested on Right in the next period by
the observers is significantly larger (and vice-versa), where this effect only arises in
the Most Successful treatment.
5.2 Risk-Seeking Over Time
Our baseline analysis established the treatment effect by averaging over all periods
of play. In this section, we investigate how risk-seeking evolved over time, depending
on the treatment conditions. In particular, if risk-seeking increased as a consequence
of social learning, we would expect to see evidence indicating a “take-off”-effect in
the average behavior. In the first period, subjects had no prior social information,
and thus their behavior was not yet affected by social learning. A take-off effect
occurs if some subjects begin to ramp up their risk-seeking in response to observing
successful risky allocations, which further increases the success of the displayed al-
locations, inducing even more people to adopt such a behavior.
The caterpillar plots in Figures 6 visualize how average risk-seeking, measured by
VarAllocation, increases over time in the Most Successful treatment relative to the
Least Successful treatment, for each trend treatment separately.11 In the figure,
each solid dot represents the difference of average risk-seeking between the Most
11Using DiffAllocation instead yields similar plots.
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frequency ● ● ● ●25 50 75 100
Figure 2: Matching prior and current period differences of allocation, for best per-
formance information. Horizontal axis intervals denote differences for right minus
left project allocation in t − 1. The vertical axis shows the interval for allocation
differences in the period t. Disks visualize the counts of cases where the differences
of allocation in t and t− 1 are in the same interval.
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frequency ● ● ●50 100 150
Figure 3: Matching prior and current period differences of allocation, for worst
performance information. Horizontal axis intervals denote differences for right minus
left project allocation in t − 1. The vertical axis shows the interval for allocation
differences in the period t. Disks visualize the counts of cases where the differences
of allocation in t and t− 1 are in the same interval.
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Figure 4: Matching prior and current period variances of allocation, for best per-
formance information. Horizontal axis intervals denote the variance of allocation in
t − 1. The vertical axis shows the interval for allocation variances in the period t.
Disks visualize the counts of cases where the variances of allocation in t and t − 1
are in the same interval.
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frequency ● ● ● ●0 100 200 300
Figure 5: Matching prior and current period variances of allocation, for worst per-
formance information. Horizontal axis intervals denote the variance of allocation in
t − 1. The vertical axis shows the interval for allocation variances in the period t.
Disks visualize the counts of cases where the variances of allocation in t and t − 1
are in the same interval.
25
and Least Successful treatments up to the current period t. Thus, for a positive dif-
ference, risk-seeking is larger in the Most than in in the Least Successful treatment
for the respective period. The figure shows that, for the stable and the increasing
trend, this difference increases steeply during the first periods, consistent with a
take-off effect. In addition, the figure indicates that adopted risk-seeking seems to
be persistent, that is, the treatment effect is not shifting downwards towards the end
of the experiment. This is fairly remarkable as the increased risk naturally means
that subjects must eventually have experienced an adverse outcome given the risk
they took. Nevertheless, it seems that dismal individual outcomes failed to serve as
an effective corrective for individual behavior in a social environment that associates
success with risk.
In Section 7.5 of the Appendix, we present regression evidence that further cor-
roborates the above visual impression that risk-seeking increases significantly over
time in the Most Successful treatment, and much more so relative to the Least
Successful treatment.12
12In these regressions, we exploit that the first period risk-seeking can serve as a benchmark for
a subject’s baseline risk-attitude. If social learning affects risk-seeking, then we should be able
to observe more risk-seeking of an individual subject relative to her benchmark level in the Most
Successful treatment compared to the Least Successful treatment. This provides an alternative


















































































































































































































Cumulative difference in reported risk taking, most vs least successful
DV: varAllocation, t−test, 95% CI, two−sided
Figure 6: Variance of allocation, cumulative treatment effect. Solid dots show the
treatment effect for the most successful information treatment, including all periods
up to the given period. Bars are 95% confidence intervals using bootstrapped group-
clustered standard errors. Hollow dots show the per-period treatment effect.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
A well-defined leadership strategy largely proves its worth through the responses it
evokes among followers. This is especially true for “leading by the successful”, which
has emerged as a prominent strategy for motivational leadership. One reason why
such a leadership practice has propagated is its potential to stimulate social learning.
By observing projects which were previously successful, other team members may in-
crease their own success. In particular, this happens if imitation allows these team
members to improve their decision making ability, based on what has previously
spurred success. In reality, success may involve a substantial amount of coincidence.
It may be hard for leaders to identify how much of a successful outcome should be
attributed to luck. For example, it is known that financial leaders tend to overly
focus on all-stars winners, while discounting actual skill (Denrell and Fang, 2010;
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Groysberg, Healy and Maber, 2011). In such situations, the effectiveness of leading
by the successful strongly relies on the followers ’ ability to identify a possible gap
between ability and luck over time, and to adjust their learning strategy accordingly.
This article studies the behavior of followers if a most successful team member is
made visible, but success is a consequence of sheer luck. Our laboratory experiment
allows us to precisely measure how the individual actions of followers – the riskiness
in their investment decisions – evolve over time, and to study how group heterogene-
ity or changing economic conditions interact with the information presented to the
followers. Our data clearly shows that average risk-seeking increases relative to the
control group, as well as relative to the first period, where no social information at all
is present. Moreover, we can exclude that this difference arises because associating
risk-seeking with failure makes subjects resilient against imitation. An increase in
risk-seeking, relative to the first period, arises in both cases, but much more so if the
displayed high-risk profile is also successful. These findings are particular striking
because the experimental procedure made sure that the independent and identically
distributed structure of the optimal projects was commonly known to all subjects
prior to the start of the experiment.
The empirical evidence gained from our experiment indicates a limitation in the
effectiveness of leading with the successful if luck and coincidence play a major role.
This limitation points to a challenge for leaders who want to understand the capac-
ity of their team members to learn vicariously. Such learning may evolve in different
forms. For example, we find that subjects seem to imitate risk profiles, rather than
the precise allocations made by the displayed subjects. In addition, we observe that
a behavior consistent with Gambler’s Fallacy arises, but only if the most successful
project is reported, not when the least successful project is reported. Considering
such details is important since our findings do not exclude that – in principle – an
28
intelligent use of performance information in groups is possible. As we have shown,
individual group members do not just spontaneously copy the choices of success-
ful individuals, but rather, they take aim at the risk profiles they observe, and in
some cases, attempt to guess the impending outcome of an investment. This insight
points to several avenues of further research, which involve the active role of lead-
ers to foster accurate risk perceptions, promote effective risk communication, and
enhance the statistical understanding of their followers (Gigerenzer, 2014; Siegrist
and Árvai, 2020).
More generally, our findings have several important implications for leaders.
First, simply providing more opportunities to learn may not attenuate the adverse
effects of imitating the successful. To the contrary, even if faced with repeated feed-
back for 45 otherwise identical rounds of decision making, subjects did not abandon
the imitation of the successful. Average risk-seeking did not wear off, but rather
stabilized at a higher level over the course of the experiment’s sessions.13 This
makes increased risk-seeking a persistent phenomenon, and the groups, on average,
became more exposed to risk. As a consequence, the likelihood of the extremes –
substantive success or failure – became larger for such groups. These findings help to
understand for example, why information about the best performers, even though
well intended in its objective to promote learning, appears to motivate excessive
risk taking in financial professionals (Lindner et al., 2019). Future research should
examine leadership strategies that provide alternatives to peer learning, for example
whether individual learning by trial and error can be effective in situations where
the performance of team members strongly depends on coincidence.
A second take-away is the nature of group composition, or the question of who
learns from whom within a group is an additional but related important element
13By controlling for common and subject-specific time trends, we can exclude that such effects are
artefacts of repetition or individual learning that is unrelated to the displayed social information.
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too. Our experiment shows that group composition can play a vital role. There
are individual differences in the extent to which risk-seeking behavior is adopted.
For example, women seem to be less sensitive to information about the choices of
successful individuals, and younger individuals are more likely to follow social cues.
Taken together these findings imply that there are ways a leader can compose teams
which are less prone to adopt potentially adverse peer learning cultures, although
more research would be needed to test these implications experimentally.
As a third take-away, we also want to highlight that leaders may need to take
the economic context of an organization into account. Regarding economic trends,
we found a significant information treatment effect if the subjects were either ex-
periencing a stable or an increasing trend environment. In this sense, a leadership
strategy that predominantly seeks to motivate by displaying the successful may ac-
tually magnify the exuberance sometimes witnessed during economic expansions,
compared to economic contractions. We found no significant difference between
treatment and control group for decreasing economic trends. More generally, this
suggests that both the dynamics of social learning and the size of the perceived
differences between one’s own situation and the success of others may be important
factors to consider in future studies on social learning.
To conclude, the dispersion of information in organizations is a part of an organi-
zation’s strategy and culture. By managing how useful information is stored, made
visible, and disseminated among the individual, leaders can possibly improve the
performance of individual team members and of the organization itself. Leading
with successful peers can be an effective rule of thumb, but hinges critically on the
nuanced psychological details of how people learn from their peers. A psychological
followership bias that works well one day can easily lead to unanticipated outcomes
the next day. In our study, as a general effect, we found top performance informa-
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tion to trigger persistent peer imitation effects, despite that the success cannot be a
result of a systematic tendency to perform well. Therefore, our data sheds doubts
on a blunt application of a “leading with the successful” leadership practice.
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Age Respondent age, in years
Gender Dummy variable, Male: 1. Female: 0
Period Period number, from 1 to 45
Money
“How much money do you have available
per month (minus the costs of housing)”
Disposable income in Swiss Franc
Most successful
Dummy variable, Treatment with most successful
information: 1. Least successful information: 0
Increasing economic trend
Dummy variable, Treatment with increasing
investment returns: 1. With stable or decreasing
returns: 0
Decreasing economic trend
Dummy variable, Treatment with decreasing
investment returns: 1. With stable or increasing
returns: 0
Table 3: Variables explanations
variable min max median mean sd skewness
diffAllocation = abs(left-right) 0 20 6 8.1 7.13 0.45
varAllocation 0 100 9 29.1 36.04 1.07
Payoff 10 170 55 55.2 31.59 0.79
Money 0 4000 500 664.45 532.92 2.5
Gender (1:m) 0 1 1 0.61 0.49 -0.45
Age 17 72 21 22.46 5.54 5.34
Least successful 0 1 0 0.49 0.5 0.06
Left project pays G 0 1 0 0.48 0.5 0.06
Number of tokens on left 0 20 10 10.12 5.39 0.03
Number of tokens on right 0 20 10 9.88 5.39 -0.03
Win factor G 1.5 8.5 5 5 1.79 0
Decreasing returns 0 1 0 0.34 0.47 0.66
Increasing returns 0 1 0 0.34 0.47 0.66
Most successful 0 1 1 0.51 0.5 -0.06


























































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Summary Statistics by Manipulation
2












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Allocation decision. Screen prompts were presented in German. English
translation: a) headline:“The win factor for your group is 8.5 in this period.” Left
hand side panel: ‘How many of the 20 starting tokens do you want to allocate to
the LEFT field?” Right hand side panel: “How many of the 20 starting tokens do
you want to allocate to the RIGHT field?”
4
Figure 8: Realization of outcome. Shows tokens invested by reported individual
made on left and right side of the screen (graphically depicted). Screen prompts
were presented in German. English translation: a) headline:“You have realized 10.0
tokens in this period.” Left hand side panel: ‘Here you can see a graphic display
of the point allocation of a group member. This group member has realized 10.0
tokens. No other group member has realized LESS tokens.” Model and Right panel
header: “LEFT field — RIGHT field”.
5
Heterogeneity: Interaction Models
Table 7: Interaction models, bootstrapped clustering
DV: VarAllocation
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11









Least successful, decreasing 20.04 62.41 −6.00 13.26 9.01
(59.90) (48.68) (6.94) (8.70) (8.98)
Least successful,increasing 17.05 44.05 8.94 17.77∗∗ 15.78∗∗
(58.07) (39.42) (7.86) (6.95) (6.86)
Most successful, stable 74.02 112.97∗∗∗ 15.24 34.95∗∗∗ 19.24∗
(53.88) (42.44) (11.97) (10.59) (9.87)
Most successful, decreasing −14.06 6.52 11.74 13.11 10.27
(44.16) (38.68) (7.46) (8.52) (7.79)
Most successful,increasing 33.76 78.77 15.02∗ 34.37∗∗∗ 24.17∗∗∗
(71.61) (75.25) (8.66) (10.65) (8.38)
Age:Least successful, decreasing −1.33 −2.25
(2.82) (2.26)
Age:Least successful, increasing −0.003 −1.37
(2.66) (1.87)
Age:Most successful, stable −2.48 −3.98∗∗
(2.45) (2.02)
Age:Most successful, decreasing 1.61 0.22
(2.23) (1.89)
Age:Most successful, increasing −0.62 −2.27
(3.64) (3.25)
Gender:Least successful, decreasing 31.45∗∗∗ 24.03∗∗∗
(11.12) (7.90)
Gender:Least successful, increasing 9.61 3.50
(14.93) (10.17)
Gender:Most successful, stable 12.33 11.95
(11.85) (9.05)
Gender:Most successful, decreasing −0.47 −7.93
(9.89) (8.15)
Gender:Most successful, increasing 22.38 17.68
(15.31) (14.33)
Money:Least successful, decreasing −0.002 −0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Money:Least successful, increasing −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Money:Most successful, stable −0.01 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Money:Most successful, decreasing −0.02 −0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
Money:Most successful, increasing −0.01 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Period:Least successful, decreasing 0.01 0.01
(0.13) (0.13)
Period:Least successful, increasing −0.21 −0.21
(0.20) (0.19)
Period:Most successful, stable 0.15 0.15
(0.23) (0.23)
Period:Most successful, decreasing −0.11 −0.11
(0.18) (0.18)
Period:Most successful, increasing 0.07 0.07
(0.16) (0.16)
Constant 4.55 −23.15 17.96∗∗∗ 4.72 13.42∗∗
(34.01) (28.92) (5.65) (4.66) (6.30)
Note:Standard errors clustered at group level, 1st period omitted ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 8: Interaction models, bootstrapped clustering
DV: DiffAllocation









Least successful, decreasing −0.72 10.99 −1.60 2.28 1.76
(13.92) (9.31) (1.72) (1.92) (2.17)
Least successful,increasing 2.97 11.65 2.00 3.04∗∗ 3.27∗∗
(11.88) (8.11) (1.48) (1.35) (1.52)
Most successful, stable 10.11 21.20∗∗ 2.53 7.35∗∗∗ 4.15∗∗
(10.86) (8.54) (2.30) (1.75) (1.89)
Most successful, decreasing −5.81 1.42 2.19 2.87∗ 2.81∗
(9.64) (7.93) (1.57) (1.60) (1.69)
Most successful,increasing 7.05 18.75 2.94∗ 7.20∗∗∗ 5.19∗∗∗
(13.75) (13.53) (1.78) (1.81) (1.64)
Age:Least successful, decreasing −0.04 −0.40
(0.64) (0.44)
Age:Least successful, increasing 0.03 −0.40
(0.56) (0.38)
Age:Most successful, stable −0.24 −0.74∗
(0.52) (0.41)
Age:Most successful, decreasing 0.48 0.05
(0.49) (0.39)
Age:Most successful, increasing −0.09 −0.58
(0.71) (0.59)
Gender:Least successful, decreasing 7.40∗∗∗ 5.21∗∗
(2.63) (2.05)
Gender:Least successful, increasing 2.58 0.59
(3.46) (2.52)
Gender:Most successful, stable 4.02∗ 3.22
(2.44) (2.05)
Gender:Most successful, decreasing 1.39 −0.66
(2.48) (2.16)
Gender:Most successful, increasing 5.48∗ 3.94
(3.08) (3.06)
Money:Least successful, decreasing −0.002 −0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
Money:Least successful, increasing −0.003 −0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
Money:Most successful, stable −0.01 −0.004
(0.005) (0.004)
Money:Most successful, decreasing −0.005 −0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
Money:Most successful, increasing −0.005 −0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Period:Least successful, decreasing −0.004 −0.004
(0.03) (0.03)
Period:Least successful, increasing −0.04 −0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Period:Most successful, stable 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Period:Most successful, decreasing −0.04 −0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Period:Most successful, increasing 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Constant 8.83 −0.59 6.40∗∗∗ 3.50∗∗∗ 5.12∗∗∗
(7.53) (5.82) (1.21) (1.00) (1.37)
Note:Standard errors clustered at group level, 1st period omitted ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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7.3 Estimations using asymptotic cluster-robust standard
errors
Table 9: parametric cluster-robust standard errors
DV: DiffAllocation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
Age −0.22 −0.09 0.25∗ 0.0004
(0.17) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11)
Gender −3.36∗∗ 0.28 −1.68 0.39
(1.44) (0.70) (1.48) (0.70)
Money 0.01∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Period 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.001
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Least successful, decreasing −0.72 1.41 1.66 10.99∗∗∗ 1.66 −1.60 1.64 2.28 1.51 1.76 1.66
(3.71) (1.38) (1.51) (3.25) (1.49) (1.44) (1.50) (1.48) (1.40) (1.95) (1.51)
Least successful,increasing 2.97 2.20∗∗ 2.31∗∗ 11.65∗ 2.31∗∗ 2.00 2.30∗∗ 3.04∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ 3.27∗∗ 2.31∗∗
(6.55) (0.86) (1.05) (6.38) (0.98) (1.33) (1.04) (0.84) (0.88) (1.35) (1.05)
Most successful, stable 10.11∗ 4.48∗∗∗ 4.53∗∗∗ 21.20∗∗∗ 4.53∗∗∗ 2.53 4.51∗∗∗ 7.35∗∗∗ 4.64∗∗∗ 4.15∗∗ 4.53∗∗∗
(5.43) (1.53) (1.67) (4.58) (1.63) (1.87) (1.66) (1.32) (1.57) (1.76) (1.67)
Most successful, decreasing −5.81 1.90∗∗ 1.96∗ 1.42 1.96∗∗ 2.19∗ 1.99∗ 2.87∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗ 2.81∗ 1.96∗
(3.89) (0.94) (1.08) (2.89) (1.00) (1.32) (1.06) (1.00) (0.93) (1.50) (1.08)
Most successful,increasing 7.05 5.26∗∗∗ 5.33∗∗∗ 18.75∗ 5.33∗∗∗ 2.94∗ 5.33∗∗∗ 7.20∗∗∗ 5.39∗∗∗ 5.19∗∗∗ 5.33∗∗∗
(8.08) (1.23) (1.29) (10.58) (1.22) (1.58) (1.28) (1.04) (1.22) (1.45) (1.29)
Age:Least successful, decreasing −0.04 −0.40∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.14)
Age:Least successful, increasing 0.03 −0.40
(0.32) (0.30)
Age:Most successful, stable −0.24 −0.74∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.22)
Age:Most successful, decreasing 0.48∗∗∗ 0.05
(0.18) (0.15)
Age:Most successful, increasing −0.09 −0.58
(0.40) (0.45)
Gender:Least successful, decreasing 7.40∗∗∗ 5.21∗∗∗
(1.61) (1.69)
Gender:Least successful, increasing 2.58 0.59
(2.19) (2.22)
Gender:Most successful, stable 4.02∗∗ 3.22∗∗
(1.67) (1.59)
Gender:Most successful, decreasing 1.39 −0.66
(1.68) (1.83)
Gender:Most successful, increasing 5.48∗∗ 3.94
(2.25) (2.77)
Money:Least successful, decreasing −0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Money:Least successful, increasing −0.003∗ −0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Money:Most successful, stable −0.01∗ −0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Money:Most successful, decreasing −0.005∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Money:Most successful, increasing −0.005∗∗ −0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Period:Least successful, decreasing −0.004 −0.004
(0.03) (0.03)
Period:Least successful, increasing −0.04 −0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Period:Most successful, stable 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Period:Most successful, decreasing −0.04 −0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Period:Most successful, increasing 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Constant 8.83∗∗∗ 6.04∗∗∗ 5.39∗∗∗ −0.59 5.38∗∗ 6.40∗∗∗ 5.15∗∗∗ 3.50∗∗∗ 4.32∗∗∗ 5.12∗∗∗ 5.36∗∗∗
(3.20) (1.76) (0.94) (2.57) (2.23) (1.02) (0.96) (0.20) (0.60) (1.19) (1.01)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at group level
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Table 10: parametric cluster-robust standard errors
DV: VarAllocation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
Age 0.11 −0.17 1.65∗∗ 0.31
(0.79) (0.53) (0.65) (0.60)
Gender −8.45 4.37 −3.33 4.88
(6.00) (3.38) (5.82) (3.35)
Money 0.02∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004)
Period 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10
(0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
Least successful, decreasing 20.04 8.01 9.22 62.41∗∗∗ 9.37 −6.00 9.03 13.26∗∗ 8.32 9.01 9.22
(15.97) (6.05) (6.77) (15.08) (6.52) (5.97) (6.61) (6.39) (6.21) (8.08) (6.77)
Least successful,increasing 17.05 10.90∗∗ 11.04∗∗ 44.05 11.58∗∗ 8.94 10.85∗∗ 17.77∗∗∗ 11.35∗∗ 15.78∗∗ 11.04∗∗
(33.02) (4.26) (5.45) (28.76) (4.91) (6.87) (5.30) (4.93) (4.41) (6.17) (5.45)
Most successful, stable 74.02∗∗∗ 22.97∗∗∗ 22.74∗∗∗ 112.97∗∗∗ 23.31∗∗∗ 15.24 22.55∗∗∗ 34.95∗∗∗ 23.42∗∗∗ 19.24∗∗ 22.74∗∗∗
(25.95) (8.04) (8.70) (22.29) (8.51) (9.94) (8.54) (8.29) (8.24) (9.16) (8.70)
Most successful, decreasing −14.06 8.31∗ 7.80 6.52 8.43∗ 11.74∗ 8.15 13.11∗∗ 8.31∗ 10.27 7.80
(18.08) (4.91) (5.51) (14.35) (4.96) (6.74) (5.46) (5.61) (4.74) (6.97) (5.51)
Most successful,increasing 33.76 25.85∗∗∗ 25.79∗∗∗ 78.77 26.24∗∗∗ 15.02∗ 25.73∗∗∗ 34.37∗∗∗ 26.13∗∗∗ 24.17∗∗∗ 25.79∗∗∗
(42.87) (6.60) (7.10) (58.66) (6.50) (7.83) (6.97) (6.90) (6.78) (7.41) (7.10)
Age:Least successful, decreasing −1.33 −2.25∗∗∗
(0.84) (0.69)
Age:Least successful, increasing −0.003 −1.37
(1.58) (1.40)
Age:Most successful, stable −2.48∗∗ −3.98∗∗∗
(1.14) (1.06)
Age:Most successful, decreasing 1.61∗ 0.22
(0.86) (0.75)
Age:Most successful, increasing −0.62 −2.27
(2.09) (2.49)
Gender:Least successful, decreasing 31.45∗∗∗ 24.03∗∗∗
(7.28) (6.70)
Gender:Least successful, increasing 9.61 3.50
(9.39) (9.43)
Gender:Most successful, stable 12.33 11.95∗
(8.16) (7.00)
Gender:Most successful, decreasing −0.47 −7.93
(6.76) (7.29)
Gender:Most successful, increasing 22.38∗ 17.68
(11.85) (12.84)
Money:Least successful, decreasing −0.002 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Money:Least successful, increasing −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Money:Most successful, stable −0.01 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Money:Most successful, decreasing −0.02∗∗ −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Money:Most successful, increasing −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Period:Least successful, decreasing 0.01 0.01
(0.12) (0.12)
Period:Least successful, increasing −0.21 −0.21
(0.18) (0.18)
Period:Most successful, stable 0.15 0.15
(0.22) (0.22)
Period:Most successful, decreasing −0.11 −0.11
(0.17) (0.17)
Period:Most successful, increasing 0.07 0.07
(0.15) (0.15)
Constant 4.55 8.12 15.97∗∗∗ −23.15∗ 8.69 17.96∗∗∗ 13.04∗∗∗ 4.72∗∗∗ 9.32∗∗∗ 13.42∗∗ 13.74∗∗∗
(13.99) (10.54) (4.60) (11.89) (12.43) (4.99) (4.74) (0.90) (2.96) (5.50) (4.88)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at group level, 1st period omitted
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7.4 Imitation: Models
Table 11: Imitation: Difference of Allocation by treatment.
DV: Difference of Allocation (simple)
Least successful, stable Least successful, decreasing Least successful, increasing Most successful, stable Most successful, decreasing Most successful, stable
Age 0.45 −0.17 0.50∗∗∗ 0.05 0.19 −0.13
(0.27) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.25) (0.23)
Gender −0.04 2.46∗ 0.39 −2.38 0.13 0.31
(1.55) (1.25) (1.54) (1.83) (0.81) (1.42)
Money −0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Period −0.02∗ −0.003 0.02 −0.08∗ −0.08∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Difference of Allocation (t-1) −0.01 0.11∗∗ 0.05 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Constant −10.06∗∗ 0.47 −11.83∗∗∗ 0.09 0.09 5.01
(5.03) (2.38) (3.56) (3.32) (5.26) (5.08)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at group level, 1st period omitted
7.5 Main Hypothesis: Additional Evidence
Our main analysis shows that average risk-seeking is larger in the Most Successful
relative to the Least Successful treatment. In principle, such a pattern could also
result if the Least Successful treatment were to induce a decline in risk-seeking over
time, while risk-seeking stays constant in the Most Successful treatment. In such a
case, the treatment effect would be driven by what is going on in the Least Successful
treatment. Thus, to use metaphorical language, if worst performance information
would be like a “poison” that decreases risk-seeking, it would be a challenge to
conclude that top performance information were a fitting “medicine” that increases
risk-seeking (Lonati et al., 2018).
To assess whether higher risk-seeking in the Most Successful treatment is a conse-
quence of increased risk-seeking in that treatment, rather than decreased risk-seeking
in the Least Successful treatment, we conduct additional regression analyses, sum-
marized in Table 12. The estimated model allows to compare individual risk-seeking
in the first period to the average risk-seeking of a given individual in all subsequent
periods.14
14Including some or all our demographic controls does not affect the estimated coefficients.
Further, a fine-grained analysis shows that this pattern is mainly driven by the Increasing and the
10
Three findings are noteworthy. First, there is no effect of the dummy variable
“Most Successful” on risk-seeking in the first period. This is as expected, because
subjects have been randomly assigned to treatments, and make their first invest-
ment decision without observing any social information. Second, the positive and
significant coefficient on “Time”, which is a dummy variable for periods 2-45, in-
dicates that average individual risk-seeking increases once subjects are exposed to
social information associating risk-seeking with least success. This makes it unlikely
that our main treatment effect is driven by decreasing risk-seeking in the Least
Successful treatment. Likewise, visual inspection of average risk-seeking over time
for all groups does not support that risk-seeking has decreased over time in the
Least Successful treatment (see Figure 9). In addition, we estimate an alternative
specification in Tables 13 and 14, where we compare risk-seeking of the first and
the last period. Again, we find no evidence that risk-seeking decreases in the Least
Successful treatment over time. Third, the significant coefficient on the interaction
term shows that risk-seeking increases much more in the Most Successful treatment,
which again is consistent with our main hypothesis.





Most successful -1.066 0.184
(4.947) (0.918)






Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 12: Risk taking, pooled model over economic trends. Variables: time - a
dummy with value one for period 2-45, and value zero for period 1.
Dependent variable: varAllocation
stable decrease increase
Age 0.04 −0.67 −0.54
(0.90) (0.46) (1.04)
Gender 13.03∗∗ 9.96 15.61∗∗∗
(6.51) (6.21) (5.86)
Money 0.01 0.01∗ 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Most successful 6.70 −3.93 −2.06
(8.41) (8.66) (8.01)
Period 45 (dummy) 21.73∗∗ 10.58 8.75
(8.70) (8.60) (8.00)
Most successful:Period 45 15.52 1.83 7.67
(11.77) (12.16) (11.32)
Constant −6.72 26.71∗∗ 18.63
(19.70) (11.92) (23.87)
Observations 132 144 144
R2 0.258 0.070 0.087
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.029 0.047
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 13: Difference, Period 1 vs 45, varAllocation. Variables: Period 45 is a dummy




Age −0.12 −0.18∗ −0.23
(0.18) (0.09) (0.22)
Gender 2.13 1.12 2.29∗
(1.32) (1.26) (1.22)
Money 0.003 0.002∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Most successful 1.58 −0.41 −0.09
(1.70) (1.76) (1.67)
Period 45 (dummy) 4.67∗∗∗ 0.83 1.61
(1.76) (1.74) (1.67)
Most successful:Period 45 1.94 0.33 1.44
(2.39) (2.46) (2.36)
Constant 3.22 9.20∗∗∗ 8.82∗
(3.99) (2.42) (4.97)
Observations 132 144 144
R2 0.227 0.045 0.065
Adjusted R2 0.190 0.003 0.024
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 14: Difference, Period 1 vs 45, diffAllocation. Variables: Period 45 is a dummy
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Figure 9: Least successful information manipulation, by economic return trend, for
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Figure 10: Most successful information manipulation, by economic return trend, for








Wir begrüßen Sie ganz herzlich zu dieser wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Studie. 
 
Wenn Sie die nachfolgenden Erklärungen genau lesen, dann können Sie - je nach 
Ihren Entscheidungen - zusätzlich zu den 10 Franken, die Sie als Startgeld für Ihre 
Teilnahme erhalten, Geld verdienen. Es ist daher sehr wichtig, dass Sie diese 
Erklärungen genau durchlesen. Wenn Sie Fragen haben, dann richten Sie diese bitte 
an uns. 
Während der Studie ist es Ihnen nicht erlaubt, mit den anderen Teilnehmern der 
Studie zu sprechen. Die Nichtbeachtung dieser Regel führt zum Ausschluss aus der 
Studie und allen Zahlungen. 
Während der Studie sprechen wir nicht von Franken, sondern von Punkten. Sie 
können während der Studie Punkte realisieren. Am Ende werden die realisierten 
Punkte von genau EINER Periode in Franken umgerechnet. Dabei gilt 
1 Punkt = 0.65 Franken 
Am Ende der heutigen Studie bekommen Sie von uns die verdienten Punkte plus 10 
Franken für das Erscheinen bar ausbezahlt. 
Auf den folgenden Seiten erläutern wir Ihnen den genauen Ablauf der Studie. Der 
Einfachheit halber verwenden wir dabei immer nur die männliche Form Teilnehmer; 
gemeint sind natürlich immer auch Teilnehmerinnen. 
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Detaillierte Informationen zum Studienablauf 
 
Zu Beginn der Studien werden jeweils 6 Teilnehmer dieser Studie einander zufällig 
als Gruppe zugeteilt. Weder vor noch nach der Studie erfahren Sie die Identität der 
anderen fünf, Ihnen zugeteilten, Gruppenmitgliedern. Die anderen Gruppenmitglieder 
erfahren ebenfalls nichts über Ihre Identität.  
 
Alle Gruppenmitglieder erhalten die gleichen Informationen und Instruktionen und 
sind somit mit der gleichen Entscheidungssituation konfrontiert. Alle 
Gruppenmitglieder treffen genau 45mal eine Entscheidung.  Denken Sie genau 
nach und versichern Sie sich, dass Sie die Entscheidungssituation gut verstanden 
haben. Am Ende der Studie wird genau EINE der 45 Entscheidungsperioden per 
Zufall ausgewählt und jeder Teilnehmer erhält die in jener Periode realisierten 
Punkte in Franken umgerechnet ausbezahlt.  
 
Die Entscheidungssituation sieht wie folgt aus: 
 In jeder Periode erhalten Sie 20 Start-Punkte. Diese 20 Start-Punkte müssen 
Sie zwei verschiedenen Feldern, welche wir LINKS und RECHTS nennen, 
zuordnen.  
 In einem der zwei Felder werden die von Ihnen zugeordneten Punkte mit 
einem Gewinnfaktor G vervielfacht; wir sprechen hier von dem 
Gewinnfeld. In dem anderen Feld werden die zugeordneten Punkte halbiert, 
wir sprechen hier von dem Verlustfeld. Innerhalb einer Periode haben alle 
Gruppenmitglieder immer den gleichen Gewinnfaktor, von Periode zu Periode 
kann sich der Gewinnfaktor allerdings möglicherweise ändern.  
 Für jede Periode wird ein Feld zufällig als Gewinnfeld und ein Feld zufällig 
als Verlustfeld ausgewählt. Für alle Gruppenmitglieder wird in einer Periode 
das gleiche Feld als Gewinnfeld bzw. als Verlustfeld ausgewählt. In jeder 
Periode haben RECHTS und LINKS eine Chance von 50% das Gewinnfeld 
oder das Verlustfeld zu sein. Wenn Sie Ihre Punkte RECHTS und LINKS 





Realisierte Punkte pro Periode:  
Alle Start-Punkte, welche sich auf dem Verlustfeld befinden, werden halbiert. Alle 
Start-Punkte welche sich auf dem Gewinnfeld befinden, werden mit dem 
Gewinnfaktor vervielfacht. Die realisierten Punkte einer Periode setzen sich aus den 
Punkten vom Verlustfeld und vom Gewinnfeld zusammen.  
 
Die Punkte, welche Sie pro Periode realisieren können, setzen sich also wie folgt 
zusammen: 
 aus Ihrer Punkte-Zuordnung auf die Felder LINKS und RECHTS  
 aus der Bestimmung des Gewinnfeldes und des Verlustfeldes 
 aus der Höhe des Gewinnfaktors 
 
Wir geben Ihnen nun zwei hypothetische Rechenbeispiele, wie sich aus den 
Startpunkten, der Gewinnfeldbestimmung und einer möglichen Punkte-Zuordnung die 
realisierten Punkte errechnen: 
Beispiel 1: Nehmen Sie an, Ihre Zuordnung sei 14 Punkte auf LINKS und somit 6 
Punkte auf RECHTS. Der aktuelle Gewinnfaktor sei G = 2. 
 Falls LINKS das Gewinnfeld ist, erhalten Sie in dieser Periode 14×2+6×0.5 = 
31 realisierte Punkte 
 Falls RECHTS das Gewinnfeld ist, erhalten Sie in dieser Periode 14×0.5+6×2 
= 19 realisierte Punkte 
 
Beispiel 2: Nehmen Sie an, Ihre Zuordnung sei 6 Punkte auf LINKS und somit 14 
Punkte  auf RECHTS. Der aktuelle Gewinnfaktor sei G = 2. 
 Falls LINKS das Gewinnfeld ist, erhalten Sie in dieser Periode 6×2+14×0.5 = 
19 realisierte Punkte 
 Falls RECHTS das Gewinnfeld ist, erhalten Sie in dieser Periode 6×0.5+14×2 
= 31 realisierte Punkte 
 
Auszahlung: 
Beachten Sie, dass am Ende der Studie nur die realisierten Punkte EINER zufällig 
ausgewählten Periode in Franken umgerechnet und ausbezahlt werden. Dabei 
handelt es sich für alle Gruppenmitglieder um die gleiche Periode. Ihre Auszahlung 
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setzt sich also aus 10 Franken Startgeld und den in der zufällig ausgewählten Periode 
von Ihnen realisierten Punkte, umgerechnet in Franken, zusammen.  
 
 
Detaillierte Informationen zum Studienablauf am Bildschirm 
 
Betrachten Sie, wie sich die Punkte-Zuordnung für Sie auf dem Bildschirm darstellt.  
 
Im oberen Teil des Bildschirms erfahren Sie den aktuellen Gewinnfaktor G, der für 
diese Periode maßgebend ist. Alle Gruppenmitglieder haben in einer Periode 
denselben Gewinnfaktor und dasselbe Gewinnfeld. Allerdings kann sich der 
Gewinnfaktor im Laufe der Studie möglicherweise ändern. Also von Periode zu 
Periode kann der Gewinnfaktor variieren.  
 
Im unteren Teil des Bildschirms befinden sich zwei aktive Felder, in welche Sie bitte 
eingeben wie viele der 20 Start-Punkte Sie dem LINKEN Feld zuordnen möchten 
und wie viele der 20 Start-Punkte Sie dem RECHTEN Feld zuordnen möchten. Sie 
können jede ganze Zahl zwischen 0 und 20 eingeben. Wichtig ist, dass sich die 
eingegebenen Punkte zu 20 addieren. Sie können keine Start-Punkte zurück 
behalten. Wenn die zugeordneten Punkte sich nicht zu 20 addieren, werden Sie 
darauf hingewiesen und gebeten, die Punkte nochmals einzugeben. Wenn Sie alle 
Punkte zugeordnet haben, drücken Sie bitte auf die Taste „TEST“.  
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Nun sehen Sie auf dem Bildschirm Ihre Punkte-Zuordnung, gemäß Ihrer vorherigen 
Eingabe. Darüber sehen Sie nochmals den Gewinnfaktor G der aktuellen Periode. 
 
 
Sie haben nun die Möglichkeit diese Zuordnung allenfalls zu ändern, indem Sie die 
Taste „ÄNDERN“ klicken, oder Sie können Ihre Zuordnung bestätigen, indem Sie die 
Taste „AKZEPTIEREN“ klicken. Sie können Ihre Entscheidung mehrere Male 
ändern, bis zu dem Moment wo Sie die Taste „AKZEPTIEREN“ klicken, dann 
können Sie Ihre Entscheidung in dieser Periode nicht mehr ändern. Beachten Sie, dass 
Sie keine Start-Punkte zurückbehalten können, d.h. in jeder Periode müssen Sie sich 
entscheiden, wie viele Punkte auf den Feldern sein sollen.  
  
Nachdem alle Gruppenmitglieder eine Entscheidung getroffen haben und der 
Computer entschieden hat welches Feld das Gewinnfeld bzw. das Verlustfeld ist, wird 
ein neuer Bildschirm angezeigt.  
  
 6 
Nun erfahren Sie wie viele Punkte Sie in dieser Periode, nach Bestimmung des 
Gewinnfelds und des Verlustfelds, realisiert haben. Die von Ihnen in dieser 




Darunter erhalten Sie Informationen zur Entscheidung und den damit 
verbundenen realisierten Punkten eines anonymen Gruppenmitglieds (welches 
auch Sie sein können). Diese Informationen beziehen sich ebenfalls auf diese Periode. 
Dazu sehen Sie im unteren Teil des Bildschirms auf der linken Seite wie viele Punkte 
das Mitglied in dieser Periode realisiert hat. Auf der unteren rechten Seite sehen Sie 
die Punkte-Zuordnung des Mitglieds graphisch wiedergegeben. Sie sehen also, 
wie das Mitglied die 20 Start-Punkte den Feldern RECHTS und LINKS zugeordnet 
hat.   
 
Alle Gruppenmitglieder erhalten die gleichen Informationen über ein anonymes 
Gruppenmitglied in einer Periode. Nachdem Sie und die anderen Gruppenmitglieder 
diese Informationen mit der Taste „WEITER“ bestätigt haben, beginnt die nächste 
Periode.  
 
Nachdem Sie die 45 Entscheidungsperioden beendet haben, folgen einige Fragen, 
welche Sie bitte noch beantworten, bevor die Studie beendet ist und Sie ausbezahlt 






 Sie verbleiben während der gesamten Studie (= 45 Perioden) mit denselben 5 
Teilnehmern in ein und derselben Gruppe. 
 In jeder Periode ordnen Sie 20 Start-Punkte zwei Feldern zu (LINKS und 
RECHTS). Sie wissen nicht, welches Feld das Gewinnfeld sein wird.  
 Nach abgeschlossener Zuordnung der Punkte auf die zwei Felder wird für die 
gesamte Gruppe ein Feld zufällig als Gewinnfeld und ein Feld zufällig als 
Verlustfeld bestimmt. 
 Der Gewinnfaktor und das Gewinnfeld sind in einer Periode für alle 
Gruppenmitglieder identisch.  
 Der Gewinnfaktor kann sich von Periode zu Periode möglicherweise ändern.  
 Sie erfahren nach jeder Periode wie viele Punkte Sie in dieser Periode 
realisiert haben. 
  Zusätzlich erfahren Sie die Punkte-Zuordnung und die Anzahl der 
realisierten Punkte eines anonymen Gruppenmitglieds (welches auch Sie 
selbst sein können) in der besagten Periode. Alle Gruppenmitglieder 
erhalten genau die gleiche Information. 
 Die von Ihnen realisierten Punkte einer Periode hängen von Ihrer Punkte-
Zuordnung, dem für die Gruppe realisierten Gewinnfeld und Verlustfeld 
und vom Gewinnfaktor G der Periode ab. 
 Am Ende der Studie wird für die Gruppe als Ganzes eine Periode zufällig 
ausgewählt. Jedes Gruppenmitglied wird gemäß seiner in dieser Periode 









Wenn Sie die Instruktionen komplett verstanden haben, beantworten Sie bitte 
die Kontrollfragen. Die Studienleiter werden vor dem Beginn der Studie die 
Richtigkeit Ihrer Antworten kontrollieren. Richtige Antworten bitte ausfüllen 
oder ankreuzen.  
 
1. Mit wie vielen anderen Teilnehmern sind sie in einer Gruppe? __________ 
2. Wie viele Start-Punkte erhalten Sie in jeder Periode? __________ 
3. Wovon hängt ab, wie viele Punkte Sie in jeder Periode realisieren? 
a. Nur von meiner Zuordnung der Start-Punkte auf das LINKE und das 
RECHTE Feld.  
b. Von meiner Zuordnung der Start-Punkte auf das LINKE und das 
RECHTE Feld, dem Gewinnfaktor G und davon, welches Feld als 
Gewinnfeld bestimmt wird.  
c. Einzig von meiner Zuordnung der Start-Punkte auf das LINKE und das 
RECHTE Feld und davon, welches Feld als Gewinnfeld bestimmt 
wird.  
4. Wie viele Entscheidungen müssen Sie in dieser Studie treffen? _________ 
5. Wie viele Entscheidungen werden am Ende der Studie ausgezahlt? _______ 
6. Wie viele Perioden spielen Sie mit der gleichen Gruppe? __________ 
7. Angenommen Sie ordnen 11 Start-Punkte dem Feld RECHTS zu. Der 
Gewinnfaktor G sei G=2. Wie viele Punkte realisieren Sie, falls 
a. Gewinnfeld = LINKS  _____________________________ 
b. Gewinnfeld = RECHTS ___________________________ 
8. Angenommen Sie ordnen 3 Start-Punkte dem Feld LINKS zu. Der 
Gewinnfaktor G sei G=4. Wie viele Punkte realisieren Sie, falls 
a. Gewinnfeld = LINKS  _____________________________ 
b. Gewinnfeld = RECHTS ___________________________ 





c. Manchmal ja, manchmal nein.  
 
10. Werden alle Gruppenmitglieder am Ende der Studie für die gleiche zufällig 





Bitte melden Sie sich indem Sie aufzeigen, wenn Sie alle Fragen 
beantwortet haben. Ein Studienleiter wird Ihre Antworten kontrollieren. 
 
 
 
